The Bible in discussion: Three recent South African publications on Scripture by Deist, F.E.
The Bible in discussion: 
Three recent South African publications on Scripture
F E  Deist 
University of South Africa
Abstract
Three recent South African books on Scripture from va­
rious theological trad itions and social circles (one 
Reform ed, one Dutch Reform ed and one Methodist, 
two by white authors and one by a black author) are dis­
cussed in order to evaluate their arguments and ascer­
tain their points of difference, with a view to enhancing 
a meaningful South African dialogue on Scripture.
On my desk lie three recent publications dealing with the Bible and biblical herme­
neutics (M osala 1989; Potgieter 1989; Van Wyk 1990), each grappling with the dis­
cussion in the relevant author’s theological tradition in South Africa. Mosala discus­
ses the situation in black theology, Potgieter provides us with a Dutch Reformed 
view, and Van Wyk writes on the discussion within the Reformed Churches (Gere- 
formeerde Kerke).
While South African politicians are presently trying to assist the birth of a ‘new 
South A frica’ through negotiations it would perhaps not be inappropriate to let 
these three publications take their places around a negotiating table to hammer out 
some sort of a consensus in respect of a ‘South African’ view of Scripture -  or to 
identify the stumbling blocks in the way of such a ‘united’ view of Scripture.
I shall first discuss the three publications and then try to determine their diffe­
rences, in order to formulate the areas of disagreement. For the sake of conve­
nience I shall present my own translation of quotations from the Afrikaans texts.
1. VAN WYK (1990)
Van Wyk presents us with a clearly written book in which the views of other (R e­
formed) scholars are presented in all fairness, and in which some older views of 
members of the Gereform eerde Kerke (GK), such as those of the well-known J D 
du Toit (Totius), are overtly criticised. Van Wyk’s rejection of reformed orthodoxy’s
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view of Scripture already indicates a sharp departure from earlier GK views. An 
example can illustrate the point. In the well-known Du Plessis trial of the Dutch 
Reformed Church, J D du Toit hailed reformed orthodoxy as the golden age of re­
formed theology (Die Kerksaak 1932:128):
W ith regard to the term ‘scholasticism’ I would say this: if used in a 
positive sense I can go along with it, since the men concerned were 
people writing in the blooming period of our theology and our R e­
formed Church...Unfortunately the term ‘scholasticism’ is often used 
in a negative sense...The men who worked after Calvin, were the R e­
formed scholastics, in so far as they worked out further and broader 
the principles laid down by Calvin. They were, therefore, not scholas­
tics in the negative sense of the word. I can mention Amesius.,.1 can 
also mention Voetius, and others.
Van Wyk (1990:10) says about this period:
Revelation was intellectualistically identified with a series of truths...
The criterion governing orthodox views of Scripture was...a compre­
hensive doctrinal system; an epistemological formalisation of Scrip­
tural authority was constructed, and the connection between salvatio­
nal authority and the scopos of Scripture became obsolete...Typical of 
the time is...Voetius, who subscribing to a rigid mechanical view of in­
spiration, polemised against Calvin’s doctrine of Scripture.
W hat Du Toit regarded as the ‘golden age’ of Reformed theology Van Wyk thus 
views as a period of stagnation. Likewise, Du Toit {Die Kerksaak 1932:128) lashes 
out against ‘higher criticism’ -  because it ‘is unscientific’ -  and dodges the question 
of w hether one can regard the Bible as the Word of God and, at the same time, 
accept that it contains mistakes of chronology (Die Kerksaak 1932:136-137); Van 
Wyk (1990:61-62 -  cf 44-46), however, affirms: ‘A [historical] critical approach thus 
does not imply theological liberalism undermining the authority of Scripture.’
This difference of opinion and the amount of disagreement among present-day 
GK theologians on the question of the real nature of scriptural authority do not, ac­
cording to Van Wyk (1990:31-32, 60-61), amount to ‘alarming tension’ among GK 
theologians in South Africa.
1.1 The key concept
Van Wyk first traces the Reformed view of Scripture from Augustine, through Cal­
vin, Bavinck, and Berkouwer to present-day theologians of the GK. The key con­
cept in this overview is revelation, divine revelation (Van Wyk 1990:46):
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* ‘It is very important,’ writes Van Wyic (1990:2), ‘to note that Augustine approa­
ches Scripture as divine revelation.’
* ‘In my view the...most important thing that has to be said about Calvin’s view of 
Scripture is that we are confronted in Scripture by G od’s revelation to human­
kind and not with human experience’ (Van Wyk 1990:5);
* ‘Bavinck’s doctrine on Scripture closely links up with his doctrine on revelation. 
In fact, for him religion rests upon revelation..’ (Van Wyk 1990:11);
* ‘[Berkouwer] puts such emphasis on the human nature of Scripture...that one 
may rightfully ask whether the revelational character of Scripture remained un­
touched’ (Van Wyk 1990:16);
* ‘In my opinion the report [God met onj], because of its philosophical premise, 
overemphasized the human side of Scripture’ (Van Wyk 1990:25).
* When Van Wyk (1990:40-50) presents us with his own doctrine on Scripture he 
subdivides the them e into revelation, divine revelation, salvational revelation 
(‘heilsopenbaring’), authoritative revelation, and trustworthy revelation.
1.2 The argument
How do we know that the Bible consists of divine revelation? Van Wyk is sceptical 
about mere rational argumentation in this regard. That the Bible consists of divine 
revelation cannot be proved by rational argument, but can only be deduced from the 
Bible’s own witness (Van Wyk 1990:47-48) and professed by believers. For that rea­
son any theory of inspiration or inerrancy trying to formally secure the divine nature 
of the Bible’s contents is to be rejected. Consequently, reformed scholasticism and 
fundamentalism have to be rejected (Van Wyk 1990:43).
By the same token any attempt at interpreting the Bible without the premise of 
faith in the Bible as divine revelation, that is, any attempt at rendering the Bible a 
mere human book or document containing human experience of (or reaction to) di­
vine revelation, is to be rejected (Van Wyk 1990:60).
The Bible can only be understood and used properly by a person committed to 
the faith to which the Bible invites him. Concepts such as sola Scriptura, canon, the 
inspiration, authority, clarity and trustworthiness of Scripture cannot be discussed in 
the abstract, that is, apart from the function of Scripture in the community of be­
lievers, since these concepts stand in the closest relation to the message of salvation 
proclaimed by the biblical texts.
The Bible should, however, not be viewed as ‘inerrant’ -  at least not when ‘iner­
rancy’ refers to modern-day historical consistency and accuracy (Van Wyk 1990:30). 
To add ‘inerrancy’ to the ‘trustworthiness’ of the Bible would require a mechanical
932 HTS *7/4 (1991)
view of biblical inspiration. The Bible indeed contains ‘mistakes’, or rather a certain 
amount of ‘irregularity’ (oneffenhede) (Van Wyk 1990:45-46).
Because Scripture can only be called the infallible Word of God in the context 
of the Bible's function (that is, in the context of the explication of the Bible under 
the enlightment by the Holy Spirit), and not in abstracto, it would be fundamentalis- 
tic to speak of ‘biblical proof (Skrifbewys) for this or that view -  as was done in the 
case of a few synodal decisions of the past (Van Wyk 1990:56-58), where the Bible 
only had to supply the ‘proof for a view already agreed upon before listening to the 
Bible. An exegetical biblical view or pronouncement invoked in support of theologi­
cal and ecclesiastical arguments should rather be looked upon as an ‘appeal to 
Scripture’ {Skrifberoep) (Van Wyk 1990:55), since the exposition of Scripture -  al- 
hough done under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit -  remains human work.
In appealing to Scripture theologians should
never try to invoke Scriptural support for any matter that lies outside the (salva- 
tion-historical) scopus of biblical authority;
be critically aware of the presuppositions flowing from their faith and culture 
(Van Wyk 1990:37, 56);
be conscious of their epistemological point of departure that could ‘colour’ their 
conclusions (Van Wyk 1990:31, 37);
adhere to certain rules for sound exegesis (Van Wyk 1990:51-54); and 
be alert to the danger of ‘conclusivism’ (i e viewing anything that can be logical­
ly deduced from Scripture as scriptural revelation -  Van Wyk 1990:53).
3  Discussion
n terms of the classical or orthodox Reformed view of Scripture, Van Wyk’s articu- 
ate exposition indeed makes pleasant reading. His insistance 
that the Bible is a religious document,
that the faith of Bible readers plays a major role in their interpretation of bibli­
cal texts -  indeed, that faith provides the basis for all biblical interpretation, 
that theology should not be done in abstracto, but from within the context of the 
believing community,
that obedience to the message of Scripture is of greater importance than ‘ortho­
dox’ theological theories, 
hould be welcomed and taken seriously, as should also his functional definitions of 
authority, infallibility, clarity and such Reformed thought categories. Likewise, his 
sensitivity for our African context (Van Wyk 1990:38) and the implied warning that 
we should not be practising theology from a ‘white’ perspective only, should be ap­
plauded.
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The questions Van Wyk puts to Van Huyssteen (1986) regarding the relation­
ship between philosophy and theology perhaps point to the Achilles heel of his argu­
ment -  as will become clear in our discussion of Mosala’s biblical hermeneutics.
After having admitted that theology should have intellectual integrity, Van Wyk 
(1990:37) asks:
It may be true that every theologian wittingly or unwittingly employs a 
philosophical epistemology, but does this imply that theology should 
be made dependent upon philosophy? Should it necessarily be a philo­
sophical m odel of rationality? And should theological insights be 
continuously adapted as models of rationality shift?
Unfortunately, he does not give any indication of what a non-philosophical or theo­
logical (?) model of rationality would comprise. Neither does he indicate how, after 
having admitted that theology should have intellectual integrity, he would escape 
from the problem of a philosophical epistemology and methodology.
Van Wyk (1990:39) is also sceptical about the category of ‘human experience’ as 
a constitutive aspect of ‘divine revelation’, a category that would -  if acknowledged
-  seriously call for epistemological reflection when speaking about revelation and 
the Bible.
One gets the impression that Van Wyk (subconsciously) realises that acknow­
ledging, all too overtly, a human element in divine revelation would
• involve epistemological questions on the level o f revelation, which would
• question the objectiveness of ‘revelation’, and consequently
• biblical authority.
Is it not perhaps precisely the notion of authority -  or rather a particular cultural de­
finition of authority -  that necessitates this safeguarding of the objectiveness of re­
velation? And, if so, has Van Wyk really put all the (cultural presuppositional) 
cards on the table?
Has Van Wyk then really escaped from an attem pt to ‘safeguard Scripture by 
means of a humanly-rational theory about Scripture?’ (Van Wyk 1990:44).
Van Wyk does not touch upon the question of the nature of theological pro­
nouncements either. Are they to be taken realistically, nominalistically, metaphori­
cally, or what? Such reflection is important, for what is the sense of an objective re­
velation if our knowledge of that revelation and our pronouncements about that re­
velation are hum an! What then is the status of theological knowledge? And in view 
of these questions, is it really possible to escape a debate on philosophical epistemo­
logy?
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Furthermore, if our knowledge of revelation -  in spite of the enlightment from 
the Holy Spirit -  can remain ‘subjective’, how was it possible for the biblical authors 
to remain untouched by this typically human ‘subjectiveness’? If their witness in­
deed rem ained untouched by their subjectivity, were they then  not of necessity 
mechanically employed? If ‘inspiration’ and ‘enlightment’ both are the work of the 
same Holy Spirit, why should they differ qualitatively? Are we not, in order to 
answer these questions, forced to pay attention to the nature of human knowledge, 
and therefore to philosophical epistemology?
2. POTGIETER(1989)
Potgieter’s book covers virtually the same ground as Van Wyk’s. However, Potgie- 
ter writes from the perspective of the tradition of the Dutch Reform ed Church 
(DRC). His book also contains, as an addendum, a document accepted in 1986 by 
the G eneral Synod of the DRC as a guide for its members on Scriptural authority 
and the use of Scripture.
Although Potgieter (1989:5) explicitly states that the synodal document was ac­
cepted as a guide for members of the DRC, he does not elaborate on the point. In 
terms of the history of the DRC it may, however, be important to note that such a 
docum ent can never acquire official status, in the sense that while it voices the 
DRC’s official dogma on Scripture, people (especially ministers of the DRC) deviat­
ing from such views do not become ‘heretics’.
Dutch Reformed ministers are, in respect of dogma, only bound by the confes­
sions of the church, not by synodal explanations of those confessions. This principle 
clearly emerged from the Du Plessis trial mentioned earlier. On that occasion the 
court accepted the argument presented by Du Plessis’ advocate, De Wet (Die Kerk- 
saak 1932:161-171, 225), that synodal explanations of the church’s confessions do 
not form part of a minister’s contractual oath and can therefore not be of a binding 
nature.
2.1 The key concept
Whereas Van Wyk’s view of Scripture centres around the concept of revelation, Pot­
gieter’s centres around authority:
* ‘A church functioning on the basis of a dubious authority should...expect to be­
come irrelevant...’ (Potgieter 1989:5).
* ‘After the fall G od’s omnipotence and love had been revealed in the form of a 
coercive authority...’ (Potgieter 1989:7).
* ‘The maintenance of authority is indispensible for the existence and continua­
tion of good order’ (Potgieter 1989:7).
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* ‘Without authority and faith...reIigion and theology cannot exist’ (Potgieter 1989: 
8).
‘...the spiritual trade mark of liberalism -  on which presentday modernist theo­
logy foots -  is...the rejection of authority’ (Potgieter 1989:11).
‘The authority with which ministers preach is the authority of the acting and 
speaking God him self (Potgieter 1989:12).
‘Ministers of the Word ordained in an ecclesiatical office have the special task 
of proclaiming the Word of God with authority' (Potgieter 1989:13).
T h a t we are living in a world in which authority is being questioned on all fronts
-  including the ecclesiastical-religious arena -  cannot be denied’ (Potgieter 
1989:14).
‘There is but one ground for the authority of Holy Scripture, namely its divine 
origin’ (Potgieter 1989:17).
‘If a preacher should proclaim the Word of the Lord with authority the contents 
of his sermon cannot say anything else than what the Word of the Lord says’ 
(Potgieter 1989:38).
‘The result of believers’ reflection on Scriptural revelation under the guidance 
of the Holy Spirit has over time been formulated as dogmas by the church...and 
are also endowed with authority’ (Potgieter 1989:57).
I raised the question above (1.3) whether Van Wyk’s emphasis on ‘objective’ revela­
tion was not a covert plea for the restoration of a particular form of authority. In 
the case of Potgieter there is no doubt whatsoever. To him authority lies at the root 
of any (sound) view of Scripture.
13. The argument
Authority implies a relationship between a superior and an inferior partner (Pot­
gieter 1989:7-8). This also applies to divine authority, which forms the context with­
in which we speak about scriptural authority. Contrary to Roman Catholic tradition, 
where authority is seated in the church, and Pentecostalism, where authority is seat­
ed in the Holy Spirit’s guidance of the individual, and modernism’s rejection of all 
forms of authority, ‘Reformed Protestantism views Scripture as the infallible Word 
of God endowed with conclusive authority, the source of all true knowledge and the 
unquestionable norm for doctrine and conduct’ (Potgieter 1989:8-12). Therefore 
preachers have a responsibility to preach the Word with authority.
The authoritative Word of God has different shapes (‘gestaltes’): the revealed 
Word (Jesus Christ), the written Word (the Bible) and the proclaimed Word (the 
preaching by the church) (Potgieter 1989:15). Through the inspiration of the Holy
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Spirit, who ensured that the biblical authors understood and represented God’s re­
vealed Word correctly, the Bible presents us with the ‘fixed form’ of God’s infallible 
Word, and it is this fixed form that has preserved the Word of God in all purity (Pot- 
gieter 1989:15-24). The biblical authors did not ‘experience’ the word of God -  in 
which case their writings would contain a subjective element -  but received it (Pot- 
gieter 1989:34). The fact that ordinary human beings wrote the Bible, therefore, did 
not lead to a Bible bound to those times and cultures (‘tydgebonde/kultuurgebon- 
de’). At most one could say that the product of inspiration was time and culture 
oriented (‘tydbetrokke/kultuurbetrokke’) (Potgieter 1989:26). The truth contained 
in the Bible is thus not a (subjective and relative) ‘relational truth’ but the objective 
truth (Potgieter 1989:35).
While the Holy Spirit inspired the biblical authors to write down the pure Word 
of God (Potgieter 1989:26) he gives the reader the understanding to read the pure 
Word of God from the Bible (Potgieter 1989:28). Yet, because of the total depra­
vity of humankind, not all interpretations of the Bible lead to the discovery of the 
Word of God. It is only when the Bible is interpreted correctly that it can lead to the 
establishment of the authoritative truth (Potgieter 1989:28). Therefore we have to 
devise rules -  deduced from Scripture itself (Potgieter 1989:32, 33) -  for the correct 
interpretation of Scripture (Potgieter 1989:29). Even though there is no infallible 
method of interpretation (Potgieter 1989:51), such rules should at least take into ac­
count that the Holy Spirit inspired the biblical authors with a particular goo/, which 
was not to present us with a ‘historically correct, literal representation of the words 
of Jesus, but to bring home to us a particular divine truth’ or ‘message’ (Potgieter 
1989:30, 44). Such rules should also pay attention to the literary, linguistic and theo­
logical context of biblical pronouncements. Because such skills are required the 
Word can never be severed from the ‘interpreting church’ (Potgieter 1989:53) and 
interpretation always requires a ‘sound dogmatic basis’ (Potgieter 1989:57).
When the Bible has been interpreted correctly the preaching flowing from such 
interpretation can also be called ‘the Word of G od’ (Potgieter 1989:36-38). Yet, 
faith  in the Word of God can only be created through the work of the Holy Spirit 
(Potgieter 1989:40).
It is only as long as the Bible remains the cornerstone of preaching that we can 
hope to proclaim the Word of God. When present-day societal problems provide 
the starting point for the preparation of a sermon -  as in the case of ‘contextual 
theology’ -  we cannot speak of true proclamation any longer (Potgieter 1989:45-46). 
True proclamation has to base itself on the explicatio of Scripture which can then be 
applied to our present-day situation (Potgieter 1989:56-57).
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2 3  Discussion
Potgieter does his best to base his conception of authority on the ‘objectivity’ of the 
Bible and its message: as divine Word it must be authoritative. In order to uphold 
this premise he has to ‘objectivise’ the Word of God and truth, limit human acitivity 
in the inscripturation and interpretation of the Bible to an absolute minimum, and 
treat the term ‘Word of God’ in purely abstract terms.
His argument sometimes runs into contradictions. On the one hand he acknow­
ledges that every biblical author retained ‘his own set of memories’, used ‘his own 
sources and was limited by his own horizon of knowledge and frame of reference’ 
(Potgieter 1989:30). All these assertions imp\yfiill human involvement in the writ­
ing of the Bible. But if this is true and if words have meaning, how can the product 
of their writing remain ‘objective’?
But even if one would grant him this notion of objectivity, his argument runs 
into new difficulties when it comes to the interpretation of Scripture. Consider the 
following statements (my emphasis):
‘It is, of course, true that truth hcis relational aspects, but as such truth is not re­
lational’ (Potgieter 1989:35).
‘Scripture does not become true when it is heard and faithfully known by a per­
son, but is true because it is the Word of God’ (Potgieter 1989:35).
‘Objective clarity as a characteristic of Scripture necessarily follows from the per­
fection of God’s work’ (Potgieter 1989:50).
‘Scripture is not unclear in itself. It is the reader’s poor insight that prevents him 
from understanding what was meant’ (Potgieter 1989: 50).
‘The basic cause of different interpretations of Scripture is the obscuration of 
the human mind as a result of the fall. The problem most definitely does not lie 
with Holy Scripture. A s iVord o f God it is absolutely clear...’ (Potgieter 1989: 
28).
* ‘Even if we always have to say, "In the light of our present knowledge we under­
stand [Scripture] as saying..." truth as such is not relativised’ (Potgieter 1989:51).
The Bible is here isolated from its readers and, as it were, viewed in a vacuum. In 
spite of Potgieter’s (1989:32) rejection of a ‘philosophical’ view of truth these state­
ments reflect a presupposed naive realist or positivist view of truth. But even this 
epistemologically problematic view of truth does not really safeguard the ‘objective’ 
authority of Scripture, since the Bible without readers remains silent. The ‘objec­
tively’ true and clear Bible thus still has to be interpreted by fallible human beings.
Although Potgieter admits (1989:28), ‘When a person...reads or studies the 
Bible, he necessarily does so with particular presuppositions’, he does not reflect on 
the implications of this statem ent for his own argument at all, for if it is true that
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reading the Bible necessarily involves human presuppositions, it renders superfluous 
the battle for the ‘objectivity’ of the truth contained in the Bible, for what is the 
sense of ‘objective’ truth if there exists a rift between the Bible and its modem rea­
ders (Potgieter 1989:49), if truth can only be known via human involvement and if 
human involvement necessarily proceeds from presuppositions?
Potgieter would perhaps argue that a specific set of presuppositions and exegeti- 
cal rules (Potgieter 1989:29, 32, 33) can guarantee the correct interpretation of 
Scripture. But how do we arrive at such correct rules? Potgieter (1989:32, 33) ar­
gues that such rules, to be correct, should be derived from Scripture itself. But this 
is begging the question, since if we have to derive exegetical rules from Scripture we 
have to interpret the Bible. But to interpret Scripture we need correct rules....
Potgieter runs into more difficulties with this line of argument when he rejects 
such ‘Scripturally’ attested procedures as pneumatic and allegorical interpretation 
(Potgieter 1989:32), and states that ‘there is no infallible method for the interpreta­
tion of Scripture’ (Potgieter 1989:51).
Moreover, if correct methods -  as prescribed by a specific hermeneutic (Potgie­
ter 1989:28, 29) and a ‘sound dogmatic basis’ (Potgieter 1989:57) -  ensure the cor­
rect exposition of Scripture, what becomes of the ‘objective clarity’ of Scripture? If 
correct procedures guarantee correct interpretation, it is a small step to a position 
where official ecclesiastical interpretation or scholarly theology becomes a sine qua 
non for the correct interpretation Scripture -  a position which Potgieter himself 
(1989:8-10, 36), in spite of his assertion that church tradition and dogma play a sig­
nificant role in correct Scriptural interpretation (Potgieter 1989:45, 57), rejects. As 
Potgieter (1989:30) himself asks, what would be the sense of Bible reading by lay 
people if only scholars can tell as what the Bible says?
Potgieter senses the contradictions lurking in the above argument. To escape 
from the difficulties thus created, he resorts to an appeal for the enlightment of the 
reader by the Holy Spirit: ‘If a preacher really wants to proclaim the Lord’s Word 
with authority, the contents of his preaching may not be anything but what Holy 
Scripture says...To achieve this he is completely dependent upon the promised gui­
dance by the Holy Spirit’ (Potgieter 1989:38 -  my emphasis).
Apart from the fact that a complete dependance on the Holy Spirit contradicts 
the call for sound exegetical methods, it is debatable whether this app>eal for enlight­
ment by the Spirit really solves the problem of correct Scriptural interpretation, 
since Potgieter (1989:38) also asserts that not all preaching of the Word necessarily 
reflects the Word of God, because one cannot say for sure whether this illumination 
by the Holy Spirit has indeed taken place in a particular instance (Potgieter 1989: 
47).
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If we do not have an infallible method of exegesis and cannot be sure that we 
have been guided by the Spirit in our interpretation, what is the practical sense of 
affirming the objective authority of Scripture?
To me the problem with Potgieters’s argument lies in the uncritically presuppos­
ed naive realistic epistemology with its distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjec­
tive’ knowledge. This naive view implies no less a particular philosophical view of 
truth than it does the idea of ‘relational’ truth, which Potgieter (1989:34) rejects be­
cause o f  its philosophical nature.
Although Van Wyk argues more carefully and lays much more stress on the 
Bible in function the problem with the overall argument remains the same: the mo­
ment the ‘objective’ Word of God (or revelation) is comprehended by humans, it be­
comes, as it were, ‘mixed up’ with our presuppositions, and -  to use the same termi­
nology -  therefore ‘subjective’. The checks and balances Potgieter builds into his ar­
gument to avoid this inevitability do not help us out of the dilemma, for there is no 
infallible exegetical method to ensure correct interpretation of the objective Word, 
and one cannot be sure whether any particular interpreter has in fact been guided 
by the Spirit.
The argum ent presented to uphold the ‘hard’ form of authority he set out to 
protect thus does not w arrant the conclusion. Perhaps the problem lies not only 
with the presupposed epistemology, but also with the presupposed contents of the 
concept of authority.
3. MOSALA(1989)
Mosala tackles the problem of biblical hermeneutics from a position exactly oppo­
site to that of Van Wyk and Potgieter. Whereas the latter two stress the objective, 
divine nature of the Bible and its truths, Mosala emphasises its thoroughly human 
nature.
3.1 The key concept
While Potgieter and Van Wyk base their views of Scripture on objective authority 
and objective revelation respectively, Mosala (1989:8) bases his hermeneutical deli­
berations on the key concept of ‘struggle’: ‘I argue that the category of struggle pro­
vides the lens for reading the text in a liberating fashion as well as the codes for un­
locking the possibilities and limitations of the biblical texts.’
Mosala views biblical texts not as containing divinely revealed and infallibly in­
spired, and therefore authoritative, pronouncements, but as the products of ancient 
class struggles. ‘The form of biblical-herm eneutical appropriation suggested in
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these chapters,’ Mosala (1989:11) asserts, ‘is deliberately oblivious to the notion of 
"scriptural authority" which is at the heart of traditional biblical scholarship.’
This choice is based on the m aterialist insight that ideas, and therefore also 
texts, ‘are productions or "signifying practices" that reconstitute in very specific ways 
the realities of the material conditions of which they are products’ (Mosala 1989:7). 
For instance, Mosala (1989:10) argues, traditional biblical scholarship’s quest for the 
historicity and authorial integrity of biblical texts ‘defme(s] a hermeneutical method 
rooted in contemp)orary W estern ruling-class anxiety about authenticity’. Similarly, 
certain biblical pronouncements reflect the ideas of ancient ruling classes bent upon 
maintaining the social status quo, while others reflect the struggle of the oppressed 
and poor for liberation from the hegemony of the ruling classes.
In order to be able to read the Bible in a truly liberating manner, one thus has to 
be aware of the fact that not all biblical texts are liberating in nature. To get to the 
authentic biblical message of liberation one has to discern which texts or portions of 
texts originated from the struggle of the oppressed for liberation.
3 2  The argument
People’s reading of the Bible -  whether they are black or white -  Mosala (1989:3) 
asserts, ‘is framed by their history and culture’. He therefore consciously chooses a 
(materialist) hermeneutical model that can expose the class, ideological and cultural 
assumptions underlying not only models of biblical interpretation, but also biblical 
texts themselves.
‘Black theology has exploded the myth of rational objectivity in theology, which 
presumes to preclude cultural and ideological conditioning’ (Mosala 1989:13). Yet, 
many black liberation theologians have uncritically taken their exegetical starting 
point in the notion ‘that the Bible is the revealed Word of God’ (Mosala 1989:15), a 
notion carrying the implication that there is such a thing as a non-ideological appro­
priation of Scripture, to which there is but one response, namely obedience. At 
best, every-day human experience can be seen in the light of the Word of God, but 
not vice versa (Mosala 1989:17).
Viewed in this way the Bible becomes an ahistorical interclassist document, the 
truth of which is not historical, cultural and economic, but eternal and has to be 
‘applied to’ or ‘contextualised in’ particular situations (see Potgieter 1989:54-57). 
But the relevance of the Bible’s message does not flow from its idealistically con­
strued universality. On the contrary, its relevance issues from its very character as a 
historical, cultural, political and economic product (Mosala 1989:19-20). The bibli­
cal texts bear the marks of their origins and history, marks which are effectively con­
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cealed by the notion of the Bible as the eternal Word of God and by the harmonisa­
tions of cultural and ideological differences in these texts (Mosala 1989:20).
Through its uncritical acceptance of the ideological assumptions of classical 
Western theology, black theology has fallen prey to the idea of a universal, ahistori- 
cal, non-ideological Word of God that has to be ‘applied’ to concrete life situations 
(Mosala 1989:22). This has caused black theologians to use the Bible very selective­
ly without having been able to tell why they chose certain and glossed over other 
sections of the Bible (Mosala 1989:11,17-18).
However, by consciously taking ‘the struggle’ as the hermeneutical ‘lens’ it be­
comes possible to recognize the oppressor and oppression in the biblical lexis them­
selves (Mosala 1989:26). And it is necessary to do so, since the reason why the ruling 
classes and oppressors can lay claim to ‘biblical support’ for their exploitation and 
oppression is that such conduct can in fact be biblically underscored (Mosala 1989: 
27). For instance, the texts on David and Solomon reveal a God of ‘law and order’ 
supporting oppressive measures (Mosala 1989:17). Such a theology is incompatible 
with, for instance, the original exodus theology (M osala 1989:20). Using ‘the 
struggle’ as hermeneutical lens allows one to tell why certain sections of the Bible 
hamper the liberation process. Instead of sharing the ‘universal abstract’ (Mosala 
1989:26) assumption of classic Western theology that the whole Bible is the Word of 
God, liberation theology can, by applying the ypdstick of ‘the struggle’, discern the 
liberation trajectory running through the Bible -  albeit ‘underneath’ the present 
biblical text or even in the societies ‘behind’ the text (Mosala 1989:27). So, for in­
stance, the liberating message of Isaiah 61:1-7 has been reworked according to the 
‘ruling class ideology’ (Mosala 1989:38).
This is why it is imperative to speak about biblical messages rather than of the 
biblical message, about biblical Gods rather than about the biblical God. The Bible 
bears witness to more than one God: the God of the oppressed as well as to the God 
of the oppressor. It is for this reason that the Bible cannot be read as a ‘bill of 
rights’ o [ as an ‘ontological product’ in which ‘the human dignity of all people...is on- 
tologically inscribed’ (Mosala 1989:29).
It is thus not enough just to be ‘existentially committed to the struggle of the op- 
pressed...One must also effect a theoretical break with the assumptions and perspec­
tives of the dominant discourse of a stratified society’ (Mosala 1989:39), including 
certain methods of sociological analysis (Mosala 1989:43ff, 55-65) used to interpret 
the Bible.
Mosala does not object to the fact that biblical scholars hold particular ideologi­
cal and political views or that they use sociological methods in the interpretation of 
the Bible. It is humanly impossible to live without such convictions, and sociological
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interpretations of the Bible can indeed be fruitful. What he pleads for is that bibli­
cal scholars should openly acknowledge their class interests, so that the perspective 
from which they interpret the Bible may become exphcit and the social limitations 
of the methods they use apparent (Mosala 1989:65).*
3 J  Discussion
Mosala takes the role of the reader seriously, discards epistemologically problematic 
dichotomies (such as eternal-historical, subject-object and exposition-application) 
and rightly emphasises the historical nature of biblical witness and human under­
standing. That one cannot speak about the Bible in the abstract, but only of the 
Bible-in-function and of the Bible as it is used -  as Van Wyk also asserts -  is a wel­
come insight. He rightly criticizes traditional Western biblical hermeneutics of be­
ing by and large unaware of the ideological nature and implications of its presuppo­
sitions. His insight that traditional theology, even though it professes the whole 
Bible to be the Word of God, always operates with a canon within the canon, with­
out supplying convincing arguments for the relevant selectivity, is also useful. He is 
neither negatively inclined towards ‘philosophy’ as are Potgieter and Van Wyk, nor 
afraid to admit the ideological nature of his stance, and consequently accepts the 
theoretical relativity of biblical interpretation.
Mosala’s critical approach takes us a long way towards becoming aware of what 
we are doing when we read the Bible, thereby urging biblical interpreters to put 
their presuppositions ‘on the table’ and make conscious choices. It certainly is not 
enough to admit that one works from certain presuppositions and then to simply ig­
nore their influence on one’s interpretation.
Mosala’s book does raise a number of questions, though. He discards the no­
tion ‘the Word of God’, because that term entails, to his mind, the notions of eter­
nal, ahistorical truth and a particular form of authority. This is, of course, not neces­
sarily true. ‘Word of G od’ can be defined in various ways and has in fact been 
defined differently over the centuries (Deist 1978).
Mosala seems to be reacting against a particular definition of the term -  probab­
ly the traditional Methodist or South African notion. But the term ‘Word of G od’ is 
not without its own history. Had Mosala followed Van Wyk’s example by critically 
discussing the history of that term over the centuries and (unlike Van Wyk) in va­
rious theological traditions, he would perhaps have found other interpretations of 
the term that would relate the Bible to God without severing ‘Word of G od’ from 
human history.
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It is not clear whether Mosala takes the remainder of the Bible (that is, what is 
left after its dissection by the hermeneutical key of ‘struggle’) as in any way related 
to God or whether he somehow operates with a concept of divine revelation -  how­
ever Sveak’ and relative the definition of such revelation.
Mosala (1989:28) does speak of a theology of struggle, but fails to say what 
forms the basis of this f/ieology. He also argues (M osala 1989:28) that the Bible 
bears witness to several Gods -  thereby implying that not all of them could be ac­
cepted as the true God -  but fails to explain the relationship between God and the 
Bible. He also speaks about the function of the Bible in communities o f faith (Mo­
sala 1989:192), but he fails to be explicit about the role of faith in biblical interpreta­
tion. He thus keeps us in the dark regarding the connections between God, the 
Bible, theology, faith and Bible readers, and does not explain why the Bible could 
help us in any way to relate our lives to the will of God.
It is precisely in order to get to grips with these questions of relationship that 
the traditional church speaks about inspiration and authority, and it is these ques­
tions the two o ther authors discuss -  a lbeit along lines which M osala rightly 
criticises. It is one thing to criticize traditional Western theology -  and Mosala does 
this very effectively -  but criticism of solutions should not supply a licence to ignore 
the problem.
Mosala accuses black theologians of an incomplete, merely existential commit­
ment to the struggle, while following in the tracks of traditional Western theology 
for the rest. 1 get the uneasy impression that he does the opposite by following in 
the footsteps of materialism and simply presupposing an unreflected and unexpres­
sed existential commitment to the Bible.
Another problem is this: Mosala criticizes black theologians like Boesak and 
Tutu of random selectiveness in their choice of biblical texts. This may be true, but 
what makes the category of struggle the true measure of the canon Mosala recon­
structs from the biblical text? With all the compassion one has for oppressed peo­
ple, I find no rational (epistemological) reason (the kind of argument Mosala uses 
against traditional theology) why the struggle should be the (only) correct principle 
of selection.
Mosala would perhaps argue that the struggle as herm eneutical lens follows 
from one’s ideological preference, and one has to applaud his frankness with regard 
to his materialist sociopolitical position. But his analysis of society -  which seems to 
provide the canonical yardstick for what is to be selected from the Bible as the will 
of G od (?) -  is from the viewpoint of methodology not really that different from 
other possible analyses, for it is founded on just another abstract W estern social 
theory which has not been developed from within the struggle itself. The inventor of
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the philosophy of historical materialism was a middle-class student of law and philo­
sophy, a lecturer and newspaper editor, who devised his theory in the confines of the 
British Museum. What, then, makes his social theory superior to other theories 
devised by other middle-class university lecturers confined to their studies? This 
may be a crucial question.
As a social theory, historical materialism is as abstract and reductionist as idea­
lism. 1 admit that materialism is a very convenient theory for conscientisation, the 
fight against exploitation, the explanation of some revolutions and even for disco­
vering certain social powers at work in the societies in which the Bible originated, 
but convenience is not a rational category. If such a choice is simply a m atter of 
faith, we end up in another form of fideism, of which traditional conservative Wes­
tern theology may also be accused.
A last point: Like Mosala’s ‘lens’, Afrikaner civil religion, which produced the 
ideology of apartheid, had also been born in fairly radical opposition to current 
theological traditions and social theories and had, like Mosala’s hermeneutics, been 
based upon the consciously chosen hermeneutical lens of ‘the people’. A few quota­
tions will illustrate my point (see Deist 1990 for details).
Lategan (1944:13) wrote (my translation): ‘We also live through difficult, dange­
rous and worrying times [made worse by] the current of humanism...And humanism 
is supported by its powerful accomplices of rationalism, naturalism, materialism..., 
totalitarianism, and communism.’ What was needed, according to Afrikaner natio­
nalists, was something radically different from these currents. The editor of the Keric- 
hode (Redaksioneel 1948:392) explained, ‘What we need today, is the brisking up of 
a true reformed piety among our people that will be in accordance with Scripture, 
confession and the Calvinist character o f our people’ (my emphasis). They found that 
lacking hermeneutical lens in, what I elsewhere (Deist 1991) called, ‘Boerecalvinis- 
me’. Of this hermeneutical invention Erasmus (1946) said that it did not ‘want to 
bear the mark of an imported Calvinism, nor to imitate outlandish Calvinism, or to 
be the mouth-piece of overseas Calvinism.’ It is a form of Calvinism following the 
‘Boerepad’, and had been ‘adapted to our national differences of predisposition, the 
nature o f our people, our history and circumstances’ (my emphasis) -  very much the 
same call as Mosala seems to extend to fellow black theologians. G roenewald 
(1952:509) describes this kind of ‘Boer’ theology as ‘a theology sprouting forth from 
our own soil and the history o f  the people’ (my emphasis), a theology that can ‘pre­
pare better spiritual food for the people of this soil than can any foreign theology’.
This hermeneutical lens had also been fairly intolerant of other possible pers­
pectives. In documents from those circles one often comes across the phrase contra 
principia negantem, non est disputandum (e g Kock 1936:85). The Free State corres-
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pendent of the Kerkbode even stated (‘U it die Vrystaat’ 1948:62): ‘For the church of 
Christ there must exist a doctrine next to the Bible...lf a person now comes and does 
not bring this doctrine, church members must leave aside their unscriptural love and 
tolerance.’
We all know today, half a century later, the consequences of this hermeneutical 
novelty.
I am not accusing Mosala of re-erecting a sort of black counterpart for ‘Boere- 
calvinisme’. I am simply pointing out certain parallels to earlier South African 
attem pts at creating an ‘own’, somewhat partisan, lens for scriptural interpretation, 
and plead for a hard look at the possible consequences of the new, ‘own’ lens Mosa­
la proposes.
One could thus say that Mosala’s criticism of the unreflective nature of traditio­
nal W estern theology is necessary, to the point and effective, but that he does not 
put all the cards on the table regarding his view o f Scripture and theology or regard­
ing the rational arguments for the choice o f his hermeneutical lens. Some important 
things are thus missing from his hermeneutics as well, not the least of which is a 
prognosis of the consequences of such scriptural interpretation.
4. CONCLUSION
The only common ground between the three authors, it seems, is the fact that each, 
for his own reasons, reflects on the Bible and its interpretation. And that is too 
small a basis for any meaningful discussion. It is thus as yet too early to prepare a 
round table for them.
If we had to identify a few items on which talks about talks could perhaps take 
place, we could mention the following.
First of all, the two Reform ed authors would have to take a fresh look at the 
naive realist and /or positivist epistemology underlying the presuppositions they take 
for granted. It is this epistemology that causes the problem of ‘subjectivity’ versus 
‘objectivity^ -  a problem which both these authors failed to solve. Perhaps they can 
learn from Mosala not to fear or to be suspicious of ‘philosophy’, but to put all their 
philosophical cards on the table.
Secondly, these two scholars will have to take Mosala’s point of the ideological 
nature of presuppositions and hermeneutics seriously. For instance, I suspect that 
the notion of authority underlying their presentations flows from the authoritarian 
(perhaps even colonial) culture in which they grew up, and perhaps also from a mea­
sure of anxiety stemming from a (subconscious) feeling of ‘loss of control’ over the 
theological (and political?) scene. One has to be very honest here, because such un­
named feelings of superiority or fear can seriously misdirect talks. They should per­
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haps consider M osala’s (1989:192) rem ark; ‘South Africa is probably the best, 
though not the only, modem example of a country in which the ruling political group 
has consciously developed a biblical hermeneutics that reproduces and sustains its 
ideological and political interests.’
Thirdly, the Reformed scholars will have to reconsider the implications of the 
profession that God revealed himself in human history and through ordinary human 
beings. They may then find it much more difficult to formulate a theory on inspira­
tion that will, at the same time, safeguard their notion of revelation and authority 
and leave room for God’s radical historical incarnation.* Mosala seems to take this 
historical incarnation seriously, since he even accepts that ordinary human power 
struggles are reflected in Biblical texts, while the two Reformed scholars -  Potgieter 
more so than Van Wyk -  seem to be uneasy with the reality of the human form of 
G od’s Word in Scripture and seem to prefer a less human Bible.
Fourthly, the two Reformed scholars will have to admit that there is hardly any 
doctrinal or ethical stance which will be supported by the whole Bible. That is, they 
will have to admit that the Bible often provides us with more than one answer to our 
questions and that it is difficult -  if not sometimes impossible -  to find a yardstick by 
which to measure these views. This insight will urge them to search more seriously 
for a way of evaluating biblical pronouncements.
Fifthly, Mosala will have to rethink the question of why we read the Bible, after 
all. He rightly stresses the human nature of the texts we read, but he does not tell 
why the Bible is important or relevant. The incorrect definition of terms (such as 
‘revelation’ or ‘Word of God’) does not imply the falsity of the notion expressed by 
them. He should perhaps spell out in more detail his views on revelation and faith 
and their relation to biblical hermeneutics.
Sixthly, Mosala should, while inculcating the consequences of earlier attempts at 
using a partisan lens in biblical hermeneutics, advance rational arguments for choos­
ing his herm eneutical key. Materialism may be a very useful tool to certain ends 
but, as the saying goes, ‘If the only tool you have is a hamm er, you tend to treat 
everything as if it were a nail’. Materialism will keep on providing the same anwers 
to questions, thereby ignoring the variety contained in the Bible. An ideologically re­
duced Bible will certainly make any talks impossible. Should we not perhaps take 
the contradictory nature of the Bible regarding social issues more seriously, and de­
vise a hermeneutic that can handle these contradictions, rather than to reduce or re­
write the Bible?
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tion, but this analogy - if treated as an analogy - can throw some light on the issue of the human nature 
of Scripture. See, for instance, Deist (1986), where a whole chapter is devoted to the subject.
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In the seventh place Mosala should perhaps, on the grounds advanced under 
section 3.3, reconsider his non-negotiable stance regarding materialism as the only 
really valid hermeneutical strategy, and acknowledge its theoretical, and therefore 
relative, nature. A non-negotiable stance inevitably renders any talks senseless -  
even among liberation theologians. Perhaps he should clarify his remark (Mosala 
1989:192) that in a society as divided as ours there ‘must certainly be a plurality of 
biblical hermeneutics’, for it is not clear whether he states a fact or paints an ideal 
state of affairs. If black theology can only be done on the basis of an ideologically, 
epistem ologically, and theoretically  d ifferent biblical herm eneutics’ as Mosala 
(1989:192) concludes, we are faced with completely different paradigms. If this is so, 
I see little prospect for white and black theologies to strive towards any sort of com­
mon goal, or for any meaningful discussion to take place.
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